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 6 
INTRODUCTION:  
 
This paper takes it shape around my own personal intrigue with Latin America’s 
authoritarian dictators as well as my fascination with the US intelligence community and the 
way in which it works with policy-makers. Using Chile in the late 20th century as my case study, I 
will dive into the event that reshape not just Chile’s future, but also the future of US foreign 
policy. The aim of this is to focus on the inter-governmental contest between the agencies that 
make up the intelligence community, chiefly the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and other 
aspects of US diplomacy, mainly the State Department (State).  
Focusing on US foreign policy in this manner allows us to take away the more salient 
observations and make them broadly applicable. For instance how did the contest between the 
CIA and State affect the outcomes of Chile? What I mean by this quite simply how did Nixon 
pave the way for General Augusto Pinochet to lead Chile down what is easily its darkest era. 
While Gen. Pinochet is not a main character in this piece, he does receive a more formal 
introduction later on. The main players here are President Nixon, his Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger, Chile’s President Salvador Allende, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the US 
Department of State. This paper is primarily concerned with the ways in which the US foreign 
policy apparatus tried to handle President Allende and his brand of Marxism. 
 First and foremost it needs to be recognized that there are many more agencies that 
function within this apparatus and even more so within the intelligence community, but for the 
purposes of this paper solely State and CIA are used. A specific lense is cast upon State and CIA 
here because it appears that throughout President Nixon’s term, one aspect of foreign policy 
was favored and one was left out in the sun to dry. I have spent many dozens of hours poring 
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over  recently declassified State and CIA documents from this time period. Items such as the 
Church Hearing testimonies from former DCI Richard Helms, dozens of CIA weekly reports, and 
countless other documents have proved incredibly useful. Just because all of this information is 
out there publically, and many scholars have done their own research on it does not mean the 
answer is black and white. As you will see, it is actually quite the opposite. 
 Scholar Pete Kornbluh has dedicated his entire life to preserving the memory of the 
Chileans who were persecuted and eventually killed during the regime of Gen. Pinochet and 
unearthing the horrible atrocities the country of Chile faced during this time. Through his work 
many of these documents came to see the light, and his work is primarily focused on the years 
after the military dictatorship had been established. It is the purpose of my work to be able to 
highlight the inter-governmental conflict between the State Department and CIA, how 
President Nixon selectively used his available foreign policy tools to help foment a climate that 
only exacerbated the increasingly volatile internal setting that Allende had been dealing with, 
as well as the way in which foreign policy develops with the collaboration of intelligence and 
formal diplomacy organs. 
It is here that I combine my love of Latin American politics and culture with my passion 
for the study of intelligence and the way in which the intelligence community interacts with one 
another as well as with policy-makers. What intrigues me most about these years is the way in 
which the US handled the situation from one year to the next, mainly the way in which 
sequential presidents handled it. To begin with, a bit of background is needed starting with the 
Kennedy – Frei years which preceded the Nixon – Allende years. Next I move into a more 
precise questioning of the US intelligence community before the 1970 election and why the 
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president did not take stock of the intelligence that was presented to him. Finally I move into a 
discussion about the way in which President Nixon fostered a climate that made a coup 
possible. That although the US did not actively initiate or support the coup, they certainly did 
not reject the idea nor did they do anything to prevent it.  
Nixon was also coming into office when the threat of Soviet expansion was evident 
around the world and the pressure to contain it was at an all-time high. When viewing Chile in 
the context of the broader Latin American region it becomes easier for us to understand that 
Nixon was more concerned with the spread of Communism through the region as a whole. So 
when a democratically elected president comes to power on a Marxist platform, the President 
is sure to respond. The US was threatened by the emergence of another possible Castro-esq 
regime in the region lest of all risk the election of this regime encourage other countries to 
follow suit. In reality, I find it unwise to support the claim the Allende would have turned out 
like Castro did given the fact that Allende wanted to maintain positive and healthy relations 
with the United States. Despite his policy programs promoting the nationalization of his 
countries mineral resources Allende was not as dedicated to the Communist ideologies as 
Castro was. It is true though that some of Allende’s UP members were very keen on the idea of 
violent revolution in Chile, but Allende did not necessarily see eye to eye with these members. 
 
CHAPTER 1: PROPER PLANNING FOR 1964 ELECTION 
 
 
1.1 – KENNEDY AND FREI 
 
There has been much debate about the who’s, what’s, and why’s of the Chilean coup 
that saw the first democratically-elected Marxist President of a Latin American country come 
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crumbling down. Then-President Nixon was no fan of the new leader and did not hesitate to 
show his distaste for the new regime, but funny enough, the story behind American 
intervention in Chile goes back well before the Nixon administration. Best stated by the 
notorious General Ugarte Pinochet, who’s violent coup led to the death of Allende and the 
introduction of one of the bloodiest authoritarian regimes the world has ever seen; “…the 
drama had begun long before September 4, 1970…”1. What is significant about this statement is 
the understanding and acceptance that the climate that eventually fostered the coup had been 
a long time coming for Chileans. It will become apparent that over time, Allende happened to 
not apply pressures in the right spots to deal with various mounting pressures within society. 
Long before the election of Salvador Allende in 1970, when Chile suffered its own 
horrific 9/11 events. Long before Nixon was elected, President Kennedy and his administration 
had realized the significance of Chilean relations and were warned of its place in history, both 
for the US and for the entirety of Latin America. The United States was involved on a massive 
scale in the 1964 presidential election in Chile. The Special Group authorized over $3 million 
during the 1962-19642 period to prevent the election of a Socialist or Communist candidate. 
This operation became known as a spoiling campaign. The groundwork for this was laid early in 
1961, by establishing relationships with key political parties and creating anti-
Socialist/Communist propaganda, as well as initiating mechanisms that had the ability to 
mobilize and influence large sectors of the population. Projects that range back to the 1950’s, 
such as those conducted among the peasants, slum dwellers, students, and the media provided 
                                                 
1 A. Pinochet, The Crucial Day: September 11, 1973 (Santiago 1982) p. 15 
2 U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to 
Intelligence Activities, Covert Action in Chile 1963-1973, 94th Cong., 1st sess., December 18, 1975s, 14 
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a large basis for much of this kind of pre-election work. In 1962, the Special Group approved 
$230,000 for the support of Christian Democrat (PDC) candidate Eduardo Frei, as well as an 
extra $20,000 in support of the Radical Party (PR). Moving ahead now, in May of 1964, the 
Special Group approved $160,000 to support PDC slum dwellers and peasant organizations 3.  
As a result of all the funds thrown into the PDC and Frei, he wins the presidential election and 
in September of 1964 is elected president with 55.7% of the vote, while Allende finishes a 
distant second with 38.9%. According to the Congressional Report, Allende is quoted in a NY 
Times article from November 15th of 1965, saying that the US was among “certain outside 
forces”4 that had led to his defeat. This is significant because of the exposure of the US’ hand in 
this election, elections that historically had been democratically sound.  
While one of the most apparent instances of US involvement in any single country’s 
domestic politics during the 20th century would undoubtedly fall on the Chilean Coup-era in the 
1970’s, the actual intervention could date back to as early as the 1960’s. There is no question 
that the US’ hand in the Chilean Coup and the overthrow of the Salvador Allende regime is one 
of the most heinous instances of US involvement in foreign politics. But what is surprising, is 
that the first sign of US involvement dates back to the Kennedy Administration, not the Nixon 
years. A little background history; in 1962 the leader of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), 
Eduardo Frei, received $50,0005 from the US’ Special Group which is responsible for overseeing 
US covert operations. While the PDC ran on a Marxist platform, the support and backing from 
                                                 
3 Ibid.,  57 
4 Ibid., 57 
5 Ibid., 57 
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the US makes sense considering the party was staunchly anticommunist. Looking ahead now to 
the preparation for the 1964 election, where in 1962 the Special Group approves an additional 
$180,000 to strengthen the PDC. Around this time, while the CIA and the Special Committee 
were figuring out which parties to support in order to align the soon-to-be Chilean president 
with US national interests, President Kennedy organized the Business Group for Latin America 
(which in 1970 becomes the Council of the Americas). The aim of this group was to promote US 
corporate interests in the region, and bring in foreign investments into the country. What this 
group did, that the various US agencies could not necessarily do, for fear of exposure, was 
channel funds into Chile in the way they saw fit; in a way that would benefit them. This business 
group, especially in the case of Chile, was created to promote foreign investment in the region, 
mainly by US corporations.  
The CIA and State Department conducted a wide variety of operations during the 1964 
Chile presidential election and campaign period, which, according to the 1975 Congressional 
Report, range from "organizing slum dwellers to passing funds to political parties."6 The same 
report describes U.S. covert action in Chile in 1964 as a "scare campaign which relied heavily on 
images of Soviet tanks and Cuban firing squads.”7.  In April of 1965 the Special Group authorizes 
the expenditure of $3,000,0008 in an attempt to ensure a victory for Eduardo Frei, the head of 
the Christian Democrats, in the upcoming September elections. The effort consisted of direct 
financial support for Frei, as well as an all-out anticommunist propaganda campaign. Not just 
the CIA, but the State Department as well shared in the rise of the Frei government. In a 
                                                 
6 Ibid., 14 
7 Ibid., 15 
8 Ibid., 15 
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memorandum to the Deputy Under Secretary of State from Assistant Secretary of State for 
Inter-American Affairs, dated July 1968 denotes the “recommendation of an Embassy election 
team made up of State and CIA personnel”9. This document notes that Ambassador Korry will 
lead a team within the Embassy in Santiago, that will be working in concert with CIA operatives 
for the support of the Frei regime. Now it differs from some CIA documents that might appear 
contradictory. In many of the CIA documents that mention this time period, there is no direct 
mention of State Department personnel for some of the more detailed covert operations. It is 
hinted at indirectly that the CIA had gotten approval from the Special Group as a result of 
Agency cooperation with State, but it is never explicitly said. It appears that from the State 
document I mentioned above, that State was well aware of the situation in Chile and displayed 
the disfavor of Allende as well. In a telegram10 from the Embassy in Santiago to the State 
Department dated November 1964, State officials met with President Frei and members of his 
administration to discuss the increased US assistance to his country. 
 The two teams discussed the loan/aid package Chile was receiving and discussed the 
balance of payments and debt his country still owed. While there is slight contradiction, it 
seems reasonable to say that there very well could have been certain activities that only the CIA 
handled, and some in which the two agencies could function together. For instance the CIA 
documents regarding the propaganda campaign and covert activities to promote Frei’s 
presidency during his campaign mention approval by the Special Group, but does not 
                                                 
9 Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee Files, c. 71, 7/12/68. Secret; Eyes Only. 
Initialed for Oliver by Sayre 
10 National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID(US) 8 Chile. 
Confidential; Immediate. Passed to the White House 
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necessarily say that State Department officials were tied to this. This could be significant in 
terms of planning an escape route in case the US was found out; plausible deniability. If only 
CIA members were aware of these plans it would be easier to sweep under the carpet. So let 
the State Department handle the overt support, the channeling of loans and financial aid to 
improve the Chilean economy, and leave the covert propaganda to the CIA.  
 
1.2 – IMPACT OF TIMELY INTELLIGENCE ON FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 In the 1964 presidential election in which Eduardo Frei won, the US played an active 
role in supporting his campaign and ensuring his victory. Support was channeled to his Christian 
Democrat party through various intermediaries. But despite the initial help from the US, Frei’s 
PDC grew increasingly polarized towards the end of his tenure. In a Board of National Estimates 
report11 it is said that not only was Frei’s coalition deteriorating, but also that if the CIA were to 
support the PDC, they should be wary of the potential fragmentation in the PDC. Adding to this, 
the Staff Report to Study Governmental Operations “concludes that U.S. intervention enabled 
Eduardo Frei to win a clear majority in the 1964 election, instead of merely a plurality”12. It is 
important to note here that the US intelligence community was well aware of the difference 
between plurality and majority in Chilean elections, which will be important distinction for the 
1970 election.  
The salient piece to take away from the Kennedy years and its impact on Chilean politics 
can be seen in the proper use of timely intelligence. What I mean by this is that with a President 
                                                 
11 Board of National Estimates, “Chilean Problems and Frei’s Prospects,” Special Memorandum, March 4, 
1968, in CIA, “Chile Collection.” 
12 U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to 
Intelligence Activities, Covert Action in Chile 1963-1973, 94th Cong., 1st. sess., December 18, 1975, 17 
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who will listen, and an intelligence community who is well apt to give the President everything 
he needs to make a decision, the US can be effective in its policies. The Kennedy years fully 
illustrate a cohesive and well-oiled foreign policy machine; one in which the CIA is working with 
the State Department and vice-versa. The activities that the US engaged in were the proper 
mixture of covert activities and proper diplomacy, and in the end, the US succeeded in installing 
Frei. While the Kennedy Administration was reveling in their win in Chile, they did not fully 
realize the effects of their work, and the world would not fully see the divide in Chile until the 
1970 election.  
 
CHAPTER 2: A POLARIZED CHILE 
 
Chile as a result of its long and rich democratic history was not as ripe for the revolution 
that Nixon and his administration had thought. On the other hand, it could be said that the way 
the political parties in Chile were split, a civil war was much more likely. It is true though, that in 
the 1970 presidential election many of the votes cast were for candidates who were offering 
the Chilean people “radical” change. Commentators are quick to use the numbers from Allende 
(36%) and Tomic’s (28%) votes to say that much of the population preferred the radical change 
that not only Allende was offering, but also the same PDC change that Frei had initiated during 
his tenure. In 1964 Eduardo Frei was elected president and he ran from the Christian Democrat 
Party (PDC). Allende was a bit like Frei, as both wanted to give Chile “change”, they differed in 
the degrees by which this change would come. Frei wanted to undergo the “Chileanization”13 of 
US owned copper interests as well as economic stabilization and a more equitable distribution 
                                                 
13Ibid., pg. 5 
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of wealth. The way this program differs from Allende’s “Nationalization” of the same interests 
can be seen in that whereas Frei wanted 51% Chilean control of copper mining, Allende wanted 
100% Chilean control. Frei did achieve much during his tenure and was able to garner the 
support of the peasant class which made up a great deal of the Chilean population at the time. 
These peasants were encouraged by the agrarian-reform policies that Frei had pushed in his 
campaign, but it was a little bit too good to be true. Frei failed on numerous accounts. He failed 
to achieve the amounts of land redistribution, saw a rise in inflation, as well as increased taxes 
on the middle class, and as a result his PDC would soon lose support for the upcoming election. 
In a CIA memo from 1968, William Broe denotes the complexities of Chilean politics, and 
highlights US knowledge of such a ripple in the current; 
“the Christian Democrats have encountered increasing difficulty in both the economic and 
political fields. Inflation which was reduced in the first two years of the Frei administration from 
a level of about 39% to 17% a year has begun to climb again. In 1967 the rate was 21%. Perhaps 
even more important than a deteriorating economic situation has been the development of a 
leftist trend within the non-Communist political parties and a growing political isolation of 
the Frei administration.”14 
It is here that the political isolation of the left-of-center group, the Radical Party, and the right-
of-center group, the National Party, feel at odds with Frei and are more willing to collaborate 
with the FRAP. 
As we can see from the CIA memo there was a general knowledge by the US intelligence 
community that Frei was failing his country and change was inevitable. But equally so, Secretary 
                                                 
14 Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/IMS Files, Job 79–00207A, [file name not declassified] Political and 
Economic 1968. Secret 
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of State Dean Rusk in a conversation with Ambassador Tomic in 196815 asks the senator on his 
thoughts about the economic turmoil in his country. Tomic responds that “the situation in Chile 
was very confused”, that “the moderates within the Radical party were not in control of the 
party machinery; that the Right was generally discredited and there were many divisions in the 
non-communist Left. It is necessary that a new combination of forces be brought into being 
which is not based upon the leadership of an individual, (caudillismo or personalismo) but 
which expresses the needs and aspirations of the Chilean people”. Tensions within the ruling 
PDC party came to full fruition in May of 1969 when the party’s national committee reject the 
demands of its left-wing faction and many hardliners of the PDC declared this proposal as a 
rebel campaign. 
 It is here that the PDC chose their candidate for the 1970 election. It is important to 
note that the Socialist and Communist groups in the PDC would not support Tomic’s campaign. 
Radomiro Tomic was the PDC candidate and hopeful heir to the throne. He inherited most of 
Frei’s support, but as one would expect, he caught much more of the backlash too. When a 
president from a certain party fails to deliver on his promises, it is easy to assume that a 
candidate running under the same party line will have an uphill battle all the way. After Frei’s 
failure, and the announcement of Tomic as the PDC candidate, the PDC became so 
fractionalized, and two new parties arose out of it. The Unified Popular Action Movement 
(MAPU) and the Christian Left (IC) broke off from the conventional PDC and joined the UP 
party. Banding together, the Socialists, Communists, Radical and MAPU parties pledged to:  
 
                                                 
15 National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL17 CHILE–US. 
Confidential.  
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“fight imperialism, the bourgeoisie, and large landowners. The parties also stressed the 
importance of nationalizing large mining firms, accelerating agrarian reform policies and 
expropriating large monopolistic firms”16 
 
As the divide deepened, some PDC members actively sought to remove members of 
Congress so that Allende would not be able to win the Congressional vote. But, as I was saying, 
the PDC split was noticeable enough that the CIA became aware of it early, shown by the July 
1970 report17. There were Centrists within the PDC who favored opening up to the Left and 
there were Centrists who were more inclined to align with right-wing groups and ideologies. 
There actually was a time when the entirety of the PDC was going to align itself with Allende 
and the UP, but a consensus was unable to be reached and Allende’s campaign rhetoric and 
soon to be unfulfilled promises further polarized the Centrists. This is significant because where 
before these Centrists were at least somewhat part of the mix, they now felt cheated and 
neglected by Allende. 
However, knowing the way in which the Chilean elections are structured make the 
picture far less drastic as it may first appear. The Chilean Constitution states that if no clear 
candidate is elected then it is ultimately decided by the Congress based upon the two leading 
candidates. The takeaway from this is that Allende did not win a clear vote. Jorge Alessandri 
who represented the Right obtained only one and four-tenths of a percentage point fewer 
votes than Allende. This shows that the population in Chile, while some inclined to pursue 
radical change, some were also content with the way the country had been previously going.  
                                                 
16  Lester Sobel and Chris Hunt, eds., Chile and Allende (New York, NY: Facts on File Inc., 1974). 19 
17 Central Intelligence Agency, Chiles Election -- the Candidates and Their Programs, report no. 0525/70 
(Directorate of Intelligence, 1970), accessed April 25, 2018, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090034-0.pdf. 
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Now it also needs to be said that the composition of Allende’s Popular Unity party while 
unique, is not necessarily troublesome for the US. In fact, only the Socialist portion were 
troublesome. As former Ambassador Korry stated “the Communist party of Chile was the 
largest, best-led, influential Communist party in the hemisphere”18, and he is absolutely right. 
The Communist Party of Chile was an established part of the Chilean political system, and with 
a direct affiliation to the Soviet Union, it strongly believed in a peaceful coexistence with other 
world powers as well as approached domestic reform through proper and legal means. It is for 
this reason as well as their longstanding roots in Chilean politics, that the Communist party 
should understand the difficulties and obstacles that inhibit any kind of rapid transformation of 
society. The background and history of the Chilean political system is necessary for one to 
understand that Allende was not going to be the next Castro. Allende’s Socialist party origins lie 
in the various forms of revolutionary Marxism, meaning anarchism and the shared belief that 
Communists were too conservative to abide to any revolutionary promises. While Allende 
headed the UP, he was far more comfortable with his disciplined, realistic Communist allies 
than of his rash and revolution-crazy party members.  
The Chilean Communists preached consolidation and a deal with the PDC, as well as 
mediation with the US.  Allende did encourage the Marxists, by giving them falsified campaign 
promises from not just this election, but all three of his preceding campaigns.  In a way, Allende 
opened a door that not only could he not close, but he must have lost the key for it too. His 
democratic victory gave the Socialists hope that their revolution was emerging, and as a result, 
                                                 
18 Interview with William F. Buckley, Jr., broadcast on Firing Line(PBS), September 29, 1974; published 
as The Truth About Chile (Dinex Mineral, Santiago de Chile, 1974). 
 19 
social disorder began to run amuck. According to a CIA Weekly Summary on “The Marxist 
Government in Chile” that was released in December 2006, but written in December 1970, the 
Agency notes that following his election, Allende was faced with a “bitter internal struggle for 
power among the factions of his coalition”19 
Allende did in fact promote certain policies in many of his previous campaigns, that 
would have given all these different groups hope and enabled him to rally them to his cause. In 
reality Allende only partially followed through on his campaign promises. As one could expect, 
the floating middle, meaning the members of the Christian Democratic constituency who 
favored opening to the Left and members who had more right-wing inclinations was now 
decisively split. Allende’s policies simply gave the polarization of the Right a far more lethal 
reality, one that now could be mobilized quickly into a true threat to Allende. The true split can 
be seen in the way the Socialists, Communists, and other leftist parties believed the President 
should run the country. The parties that unified around Allende had such differing philosophies 
that it makes it hard to defend the claim that Allende would have seriously pursued the path of 
revolutionary Marxism that some of his Socialist backers favored.  
 
2.1 – WHY DIDN’T THE US TAKE MORE STOCK IN CHILE? 
 
When viewing the situation in Chile it is necessary to realize the switch in policy the US 
undertook. Trying to understand this switch in policy deems it necessary to realize that the US 
as an entity, meaning all the various agencies and branches that subset it, at the end of the day 
take their actions based on the president and his views. In the testimony of former DCI Richard 
                                                 
19  Central Intelligence Agency, The Marxist Government in Chile: Its Evolution, Realization, and 
Prospects, Weekly Summary Special Report 43, [pg. 5]. 
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Helms, to the Senate Committee to Study Governmental Operations, in September of 1975, 
Helms notes the importance of taking action well before it is too late. He acknowledges that in 
the early ‘60’s when the Kennedy Administration wanted to back Eduardo Frei, it was so done 
so “a year or two before the election…” and with resources well “enough in advance so they 
actually did some good”20 What Helms is referring to is the extensive planning, in terms of 
money and support, that is needed so that covert operations of this sort can achieve the 
intended result. The intelligence apparatus that makes up the US’ intelligence community, 
meaning the FBI, CIA, NSA, Homeland Security, etc., all act within a larger umbrella of US 
foreign policy and these agencies, while all handling different aspects of US/world intelligence, 
have to take barking orders from someone.  
As is also the case with all of these agencies, is that the agendas will fluctuate depending 
upon who is in office. For instance, when Kennedy was in office, he was very adamant about 
support Frei and he made so very clear early on in his election campaign. Whereas when the 
Nixon Administration realized that Allende could cause some serious problems for US and Latin 
American relations, the necessary actions were taken a bit too late. It is also important to note 
that it is not because the US did not realize what was going on in Chile during this time, just that 
policymakers were too busy with other things to heed the intelligence agencies warnings.  
When looking at a memorandum titled Policy Decisions Related to Our Covert Action 
Involvement in the September 1970 Chilean Presidential Election by the CIA, we learn that the 
                                                 
20 Hearing Held before Senate Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to 
Intelligence Activities (1975) (statement of Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms). [pg. 15] 
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US intelligence community was well aware whom the “main candidates would probably be”21. 
So the US intel community knew that the support for Allende was far higher than previously 
believed, and in this document they try to ration out what kind of covert action to take to try to 
sway the election in the US’ favor. It is said in bullet-three, that a joint Embassy/Station 
proposal for a campaign directed against Allende was submitted to the 303 Committee. This 
proposal was submitted in December of 1969. What is important from this, is the cohesion 
between the State Department and CIA. The inclusion of “Embassy/Station”, shows that both 
agencies were utilizing all their tools to work together on this matter. So, as it seems, in the 
earlier phases of the planning, both were in the loop. This is rather important to note that both 
the CIA and State Department were working in unison on this matter. 
Later in the same memorandum, it is noted that on March 5, 1970 a similar proposal 
was resubmitted and it now reflected the State/CIA consensus that the US government should 
not support any candidate individually, for fear of the backlash. Inside the memorandum, it is 
apparent that while State and CIA officials were working together on this matter, but were not 
in total agreement about what steps should be taken. State officials seem more apprehensive 
about US involvement in any way, but it is stated that both agencies agreed that “spoiling 
actions”22 should be taken against the Popular Unity electoral front. This proposal was 
ultimately approved in March by the 40 Committee. I think it is also important to note that the 
US was very wary of the pressures being exerted on US businesses and government for direct 
funding of the Alessandri and Tomic forces. While much of the actual numbers and names in 
                                                 
21  Central Intelligence Agency, Policy Decisions Related to Our Covert Involvement in the September 
1970 Chilean Presidential Elections (Washington, DC, 1970), pg. 1 
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this document are blacked out, which is routine for documents of this security level, it is stated 
that roughly $1.1 million in foreign business funds went to the Alessandri campaign. As I just 
said, the exact name of whom gave the money and the exact amount are unknown, it is noted 
that these funds were given from the US business community to protect US concerns in Chile.  
What we can gather from this is that the US business community was worried about the 
land reform programs that Allende had proposed in his campaign as it would take land and 
ultimately revenue away from US corporations. So while we can see from this document that 
the other campaigns were receiving covert funds from the US business community, the US 
government was not directly involved in channeling funds to either candidate. It is said that 
“This meeting did not give any further serious consideration to direct support to either Tomic or 
Alessandri.”23. In the same document it is noted that “should the tone or content become pro-
Alessandri rather than anti-UP, our support will cease.”24The last thing to make mention of 
from this memorandum, is that the notion of Phase II was designed to influence a sufficient 
number of members of congress to “vote in a manner which will assure that he is denied the 
presidency”25 
According to a memorandum for the 40 Committee, titled Political Action Related to 
1970 Chilean Presidential Election indicates that “on 19 January 1970 representatives of State 
and CIA…met to discuss the current political situation in Chile and the covert action operations 
which were being conducted or proposed to reduce the chance of a UP victory”26. In this 
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document a brief overview of the political parties in Chile and their polling popularity are noted. 
The document also establishes the why and how covert action was desired in this case, and 
what the intelligence community was thinking of Chilean society and politics at the time. This 
same memorandum makes note that the 40 Committee authorized the covert contacts with 
members of one political party (ambiguity because this portion of the document is blacked out). 
But the goal of this authorization was to enable the moderate Radicals within the party to gain 
more influence. 
 According to this document the action taken by the CIA and State Department to help 
influence these parties had failed by and large. The hopeful effect of this covert action was to 
reduce the chance of the party moving closer to a merger with the Communists and Marxists. 
This is what is meant by it failed; “this trend was confirmed during the July 1969 convention 
when dissident moderates were purged from the PR hierarchy”27. While a good amount of this 
document is blacked out, so the exact amount of funds being given and names of people who 
were being assisted are unknown, it is evident that the CIA and State Department were heavily 
involved in Chilean politics during this time and that Ambassador Korry was the main proprietor 
of this action. Seeing how Ambassador Korry was the main boots-on-the-ground in a sense, so 
he had a good amount of pull in the early years since it was after all his home turf. 
 Korry also agreed to two other proposals to assist the PDR. This first effort consisted of 
financing some kind of trip (blacked out so details are vague) in order to undercut PR and UP 
strength. The purpose of these trips were to also try to rally Radical voters to unite against the 
UP. The second effort was more of a direct payment to a PDR staff member so that he can 
                                                 
27 Ibid., pg. 10 
 24 
“maintain an office to be used for party work”28. What is very important and significant of this 
level of covert action, which is very apparent in this early document, is that the CIA and State 
Department wanted to reduce electoral support for the PR and Allende. They did not want it to 
become “a vehicle for promoting Alessandri’s candidacy”29. This is super significant because it 
shows that in the early stages of this era, the US was very aware of any kind of affiliation and 
direct support for other Chilean parties. The US did not want to become a promoter of Chilean 
politics, this would have been bad press and could lead to serious controversy, so the action 
was to be directed towards the undermining of Allende’s support rather than the promoting 
support for Alessandri or others. 
The ultimate recommendations proposed at the end of this document are very telling of 
the level of US support and intervention. The US realized that support for Tomic or Alessandri 
would be a dead-end and it is stated that it would take a serious amount of financing and 
support to be able to make Tomic a real contender in the election. But what is also made note 
of is that the platform on which Tomic would run, would “indicate that a government led by 
him would be apt to take some actions not consonant with US interests” 30. So clearly the US is 
very much thinking of the long-term strategic aspect of who to support in leading Chile. What is 
also very indicative of US sentiments towards Allende are heavily viewed in a Cold War-esq 
lense. It is said towards the end of the document that “Based on Allende’s own views, plus the 
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public platform of the UP, we must assume that an Allende victory would mean the emergence 
of a Castro-type government in Chile.”31. 
 
CHAPTER 3: NIXON YEARS  
 
 
3.1 – NIXON AND KISSINGER 
 
Looking back on the Kennedy era, and the mechanisms that were established to ensure 
Frei’s victory, we now know that some of the usefulness of these assets were “limited for their 
increased visibility”32. This is increasingly important if we are to try to distinguish why the Nixon 
administration did what it did. By not having sound means of intervening it becomes more clear 
why Tracks I & II were established. Much of the scare campaign that happened during Allende’s 
campaign had not played out the way the US had hoped. While this propaganda campaign did 
not succeed in preventing Allende from taking office, it had several key impacts in the years 
following his election. Many of the aspects of mass mobilization and the ideologies that had 
been planted in the Chilean mind during this campaign, only intensified after Allende’s actual 
election. The groups that the US chose to covertly fund and support soon became more of a 
behemoth than the US had previously thought. The media that was at risk of being cut under 
Allende soon became a prominent focal point of many of the issues that radical and 
revolutionary Chileans had voiced.   
In 1967 Allende founds the Organization of Latin American Solidarity, which is a coalition 
of leftists groups, and Henry Kissinger is quoted as claiming that it was “Havana based” and 
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“dedicated to armed struggle against the United States” 33. This is one of the long line of 
statements that Dr. Kissinger made during his tenure, and it should be evident enough that he 
had serious qualms with the Chilean political leader Salvador Allende. In a memorandum titled 
Policy Decisions Related to Our Covert Action Involvement in the September 1970 Chilean 
Election34 it is noted that on March 5, 1970 there was a State Department and CIA consensus 
that the US Government should not take up support for any one candidate, rather should 
engage in spoiling operations against the Popular Unity (UP) front and their candidate, Allende. 
On March 25th these actions were approved by the 40 Committee and furthermore, the plans 
took cognizance of the possible need to directly support one candidate if the prospect of an 
Allende victory was dawning. In the summary of this memorandum it is noted that there is a 
“tradition of seven years involvement with the elements of the Chilean polity”35, but it is also 
noted that the “independent nature” of the Alessandri machine works against any serious 
considerations the CIA had for supporting the party. What this shows is that the CIA and State 
Department were wary of the poor structure of Alessandri’s campaign, and did not want to 
directly fund/support him for fear of overexposure and fear of being found out. What this 
document also shows, is that the Agency and State were working together, if not at the very 
least sharing information and opinions in response to the Chilean situation.  
Examining this topic and the multiple complexities of the Chilean case, there is a 
necessity to highlight the role that both President Nixon and his Secretary of State Henry 
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Kissinger played. This one aspect touches upon the reasons why the US intelligence community 
acted the way it did and show us a great deal about the way the intelligence community 
interacts with policy-makers; which is a huge takeaway from this whole project. President Nixon 
came into office after President Kennedy and as a result carried a different view of foreign 
policy with him. Nixon came into office on the platform to end the war in Vietnam. As a result 
of this, his foreign policy centered around the fight for Asia, which makes sense. But the 
president of a world power and a man in his unique position needs to take the uttermost care 
when handling certain world events. Looking back on what transpired in Chile with Allende and 
then eventually with Pinochet, we can safely say that had Nixon and his administration focused 
on properly handling Chile, possibly through a more diplomatic, more overt manner, then 
certain event might not have unfolded. 
 Obviously this is speculation as we cannot simply say decisively one way or another 
what or what could have happened. But when presidents do not actively take full stock of the 
gathered intelligence, they are at fault. Additionally, Nixon chose to exclude the State 
Department and Ambassador Korry from the decision-making process let alone even the 
planning process. This is telling of the kind of diplomatic muscle that Nixon wanted to exercise 
over Chile. This perfectly shows the presidents favoritism for and usage of the intelligence 
community and their vast resources over the State Department and more formal diplomacy. 
Even the manner in which the US intelligence community viewed a coup in Chile in 1973 
is telling of the way the intelligence community works towards a Presidents desired agenda. In 
early August of that year the CIA stated in an intelligence memorandum that “Army 
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Commander Prats remains the prime obstacle. He is so strongly opposed to a coup”36 At this 
present moment, the US intelligence community believes a coup is unwise and that it would not 
only fail miserably if attempted. But what is even more important is that they realize that a 
coup would only strengthen Allende and solidify his interior cabinet. Also possibly making the 
military come to their senses and rejoin the cabinet forces without getting the requested 
privilege to make policy decisions, which was the main reason why the military did not want to 
rejoin the Allende government. What this document highlights is that the US intelligence 
community was aware that any direct contact with the Chilean military would be a dead end. 
Without top officials pressing for the overthrow of Allende, the military would not budge. It is 
at this point that the Nixon Administration realizes that too much effort could be costly and 
blow up in their face. So even despite plenty of early-warnings, and even late ones that the 
Presidents hopes for a coup was realistically not feasible, the President still went on with his 
policy of doing anything possible to wreak havoc upon Chile.   
 
3.2 – NIXON’S MINDSET 
 
The case for Chile is an increasingly interesting one, more so than any other country in 
Latin America in terms of the effect of US and Soviet policies. Eduardo Frei Montalva, Salvador 
Allende, Augusto Pinochet each represented a position in world politics. The same has not 
happened with Argentine rulers, nor Peruvian ones. In a certain way the APRA of Peru and 
Peronism in Argentina are local phenomenon. It would be difficult for them to have taken on 
the connotations of Chilean leaders who assumed international ideologies or outlooks. It is in 
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this context, of competing worldviews and ideologies that makes Chilean leaders and politics so 
interesting. The inflows of US support, mainly monetary support for Chilean political parties 
reached astonishing heights in the 1960s through the ‘70s. In 1970, about $425 thousand were 
approved to be sent to non-Marxist candidates and then in 1971 another $3,577,000 was sent 
to similar candidates. The way in which the US tried to do anything and everything in their 
power to be able to ensure a candidate of their choosing would win the election proves that the 
US was more concerned with promoting anti-Marxist/communist ideals and leaders. The way in 
which two worlds collided, making the country its stomping ground for both Soviet and 
American policy, makes Chile a clear example of the way foreign policy affected the results of 
domestic politics.  
 
As Lawrence Weschler writes: 
 
“The enemy -- the International Communist Movement -- is perceived as covertly operating 
everywhere, all the time, in all fields of human endeavor. The threat is no longer conceived as 
one of conventional war, nor even as one of sedition (the doctrine's word for armed 
insurrection), but rather as one of subversion”37 
 
This truly was the perceived enemy during the 1970’s for almost all military dictatorships in 
Latin America. Within this mindset one can understand why these dictators chose to form this 
intelligence system. What also needs to be understood within this context of international 
communism, is the strong domestic insurrections that made many Latin American leaders 
uneasy. Not only did it trouble these leaders, but even more so, it made the US very concerned 
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for the fate of the region. Taking into account the Cold War era mentality of the US, especially 
with Cuba being a Soviet satellite, the US was more than happy to assist these nations in 
tracking and hunting down known communist sympathizers and ensuring the longevity of these 
dictatorships.  
The use of covert operations are some of the more atypical forms of foreign policy the 
US chooses to engage in. Most foreign aid is given through organizations like USAID, with the 
intent of the US being the promotion of civil society or the strengthening of political parties. 
This type of clandestine action is controversial to say the least. It is not a proper, let alone 
democratic, form of foreign policy. Covert action should be used as a last resort, an end-all-be-
all option. What this shows is that democracy really was not the goal in the end. The manner in 
which these operations were set up and carried out and the level of CIA assistance, combined 
with the true political disregard for things such as human rights show that combatting 
communism in the region and ensuring Latin American dictators who will align with US interests 
was the true goal. 
What they mean by this is that while many were backing him, such as the media and 
universities that were highly influenced by the Communists and Socialists. But many wealthy 
and influential Chileans felt threatened by Allende’s proposed policies. So these individuals took 
it upon themselves to get rid of Allende. But, this coup attempt against Allende never really got 
off the ground and the shooting of the commander in chief of the army, two days before the 
election, turned out to be a huge advantage for Allende. For this, the US did not have any say in 
this matter, it was totally on the Chileans, but the US soon realized the negative affects this 
would have as the Chilean public was outraged and shocked at the attempt, and the 
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assassination actually united the politically divided armed forces behind Allende’s legal right to 
the presidency. So once in office, Allende quickly moved to consolidate and named Communists 
and Socialists to key cabinet positions. Within the language of the CIA document it is evident 
that the Agency felt threatened by Allende’s election. Towards the end of the document it 
mentions Chile’s recognition of Cuba under Allende, and his improved relations with places like 
Albania, East Germany and North Korea, which demonstrates the fear the US had of a new and 
democratically elected Castro, in the once model Latin American democracy.  
Viewing the Chilean situation in the shadow of the Cuban and Castro era, should not be 
seen as controversial, despite it being problematic. Intelligence agencies are not fortune tellers, 
they do not predict the future with 100% certainty. They are meant to look at ongoing 
situations and developments, in lieu of history. They are to use historical facts, to try to 
understand ongoing political developments and try to draw connections or interpret reasons 
for the how and why present situations play out. So while it is problematic the intelligence 
community used Cuban infiltration as a bit of a scapegoat for much of the developments in 
Chile, it is not to be seen as incorrect. There is an inherent issue in the intelligence community 
with faulty intelligence or faulty analysis. This is not to say it is wrong, for at the time it is being 
done, they believed it to be true. Only in retrospect can we say it is wrong. According to the 
Background for Chilean Hearings from March 197238, it is noted that Beatriz Allende, the 
President’s daughter, was married to Luis Fernandez Ona, who was among the Cuban officials 
that belonged to the Cuban Intelligence Service. Now while this could just be true-love at its 
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finest, it is also noted in this CIA document that since Allende’s inauguration, the Cuban official 
presence has gone from zero personnel to around 5439.  
Henry Kissinger is quoted as saying in the Congressional Report40 that if Allende were 
elected president, he will establish some kind of Communist government. But even this being 
said, it is so rash of Kissinger, and telling of his and the president’s wishes for Allende’s Chile to 
equate Allendes administration as that of Castro in Cuba. What it comes down to is that while 
the Soviet Communist party might be inclined to support Communist parties all over the world, 
that does not necessarily mean that social revolution is ripe. In the National Intelligence 
Estimates in Section IV of the 1975 Congressional Report, it is said that these more extreme 
fears were ill founded. The Report finds that “there was never a significant threat of a Soviet 
military presence; the export of Allende’s revolution was limited”41. So here we see a clear 
disconnect between top level policy-makers, and the intelligence apparatus. Kissinger and 
Nixon let their fear of Communist inroads in Latin America, which is understandable, they did 
not take proper steps to further analyze/digest intelligence material on the issue. If they would 
have, they would have seen that Allende was not Castro, nor was his brief time in office even 
close to that of its Cuban neighbor.  
 
3.3 – WHO AUTHORIZES THE CIA? 
 
The 40 Committee during this time plays the overall team-role in many ways. It is 
comprised of the Chairman who acts as the quarterback, and his various positions intent on 
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delivering him success, in any way is possible. It does not matter how you score a goal, so long 
as the ball goes in the net. The Committee was made up primarily of CIA officials, as well as key 
military personnel like the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and even the Attorney 
General John Mitchell sat on as a personal friend to Nixon. During the latter half of Track I a 
different working group comprised of the CIA’s Western Hemisphere Division Chief, State 
Department officials, the National Security Council, and Treasury was created for the 
implementation of the propaganda and economic action. The political action campaign in many 
ways was a defeat as it failed to convince Frei to get behind the plan and work with the US, Frei 
seemed too dedicated to his country’s values. The Committee is essentially the governing body 
for the CIA. In an ideal world, all agencies would work together, so the 40 Committee would be 
approving joint ventures for the State and CIA. As is noted in the Congressional Report42, the 
CIA should coordinate with the State Department before submitting proposals to the 40 
Committee. But as we will see, there were huge differences of opinion with regards as to 
course of action in Chile within the Committee itself. 
The 40 Committee was chaired by Henry Kissinger, and a NY Times article from 197543 
quotes the hearing of Mr. William Colby, who was former DCI, by Senator Symington. The 
testimony is as follows;  
- Senator Symington: Who is the chairman? 
- Mr. Colby: Well, again, I would prefer to go into executive session on the description of 
the Forty Committee, Mr. Chairman. 
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- Senator Symington (incredulous): As to who is the chairman, you would prefer an 
executive session? 
- Mr. Colby: The chairman, all right, Mr. Chairman, Dr. Kissinger is the chairman as the 
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.  
When thinking about the amount of time it took for the president and his colleagues to 
heed the advice of the intelligence community and the work they had already been doing in the 
region prior to his presidential oath, one can understand that Vietnam was Nixon’s main 
priority. Up to this point I have simply reviewed the environment that was already present in 
Chile. The Right and Left in Chile were extremely polarized. By highlighting the inner workings 
of the Chilean political system that the Allende regime came into we can better understand the 
exact role that the US had in its downfall.. By applying the right pressure on Chilean society, a 
proper environment for a coup was created by Nixon and his administration. Even though there 
was no direct Soviet threat, nor an expansion of Allende’s revolution to other parts of Latin 
America, Nixon and Kissinger still played the cool public posture yet also engaged in extensive 
covert activities. All of those factors plus the strangling of the Chilean economy, exacerbating 
the turmoil already being felt by the economy led to the perfect climate in which the US did not 
have to tell anyone how or what to do. The setting was already set and whether the US 
believed it or not, Chile was ripe for the picking.  
 
CHAPTER 4: THE TRACKS TO DERAILMENT 
 
 
4.1 – TRACK I 
The 40 Committee officially approved the plans for Track I following the September 14th 
meeting in 1970. This track had three subsections to it including, political action, a propaganda 
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campaign, as well as economic pressures. The beginning phase to this track consisted of a 
deceivingly constitutional method to ensure Allende stayed out of office, while at the same 
time implementing a candidate in the US’ favor. Both the 40 Committee and the CIA agreed 
that the “Frei re-election gambit”44 was a sound means to an end. What is interesting here is 
that Track I becomes reality only after Allende wins the plurality and the election will go a 
Congressional vote. But the original idea actually dates back to 1968 when the US, was too 
easily influenced by past successes. Meaning the US was a little too quick to get on their high 
horse and compare foreign policy tools and make the wrongful claim that it will work again 
same as before. As a CIA memo45 dated April 1968 from William Broe to Henry Karamessines 
notifies him of the initial plan for Track I: 
“Using information and analyses provided by the Embassy's political section as well as from the 
Station has begun to put together a political action program to be carried out within the 
context of the overt effort. The final political action proposal will be a joint Station/Embassy 
effort with the Ambassador playing the key role.” 
 
The plan for Track I was in a way, similar to the Kennedy years in which various agencies 
acted as the brains and brawn of US foreign policy. Over the weeks that unfolded, not much of 
a dent was made into Chile following the Frei re-election gambit and Nixon decided it was time 
for another route. The propaganda campaign and the economic pressures had a profound 
impact upon the coup climate. In many ways this was the right way to influence mass sectors of 
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the population. With the State Department and Ambassador Korry left out of the loop for these 
phases, it seems evident that Nixon hoped to begin the coup process covertly. By producing 
propaganda and supporting certain groups already established in Chilean society, the CIA 
“sought to create concerns about Chiles future if Allende were elected; the propaganda was 
designed to influence Frei, the elite, and the military”46. When the first political pressure option 
failed the 40 Committee took to imposing an economic offensive against Chile, which consisted 
of cutting off all international credits to Chile as well as pressuring firms to reduce investment 
in Chilean businesses and infrastructure. Ultimately Track I failed to generate the economic 
crisis that it so desperate craved, and thus failed to stimulate the Chilean military to take 
serious action against Allende. So clearly both the State Department and the CIA were aware of 
this track and had set it upon their respective agendas, but it failed to materialize into anything 
substantial. 
 
4.2 – TRACK II  
 
Richard Helms was directed by President Nixon to prevent Allende from taking power, 
and that this effort was to be “conducted without the knowledge of the Departments of State 
and Defense or the Ambassador”. Track II was also never discussed at a formal 40 Committee 
meeting. This track in reality, was the end all be all game, either coup or no coup. Track II 
consisted of US officials bribing/convincing Chilean military leaders to take up a coup against 
Allende and his government. On November 18th, 1970, there was a Report on CIA Chilean Task 
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Force Activities that was put out. Within this document it is explicitly stated that “On 15 
September, 1970, CIA was directed to try to prevent Marxist Salvador Allende’s assent to the 
Chilean presidency on 3 November. This effort was to be independent of concurrent endeavors 
being undertaken through, or with the knowledge of, the 40 Committee, Department of State, 
and Ambassador Korry.”47. This intelligence brief also displays the fact that Frei was not 
responding positively to US desires for a military coup, it is decided that whether or not Frei 
was on board, the Agency would move forward with its contacts within the Chilean military. 
While Track I and II were different routes, they had the same basic outcome, a military coup 
that removed Allende from office. The difference of Track II stems from its exclusion of the 
Departments of State and Defense and without the knowledge of Ambassador Korry. Track I did 
have the coup aspect to it, but it was hinged on the concurrence of Frei. At the end of the day 
neither of the Tracks accomplished the intended goal of preventing Allende from taking office, 
but each Track had left significant imprints upon the already strained Chilean society.  
What is significant to note from the 1975 Senate Report, is that for Track II the CIA was 
using its own direct contacts with the Chilean military, and was not contingent upon approval 
from Frei, nor the State Department. It is said in the report that “it was to be known only to a 
small group of individuals in the White House and the CIA”48. So while we can see that in the 
instance of Track II development, Nixon and Kissinger believed it imperative that if a coup were 
to work and work well, it needed be done strictly under CIA guidance. At the end of the day, 
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both Tracks failed to gain the ground the US was so badly losing. Certain elements within the 
Chilean army were actively involved in coup plotting, and at one point were receiving funds 
from the CIA, but Kissinger pulled the plug on these plans and they never got off the ground 
with active US support. 
  
CHAPTER 5: NIXONS POLICIES AND HIS AFFECT ON CHILEAN SOCIETY 
 
 
5.1 – THE CLIMATE 
 
 
While Nixon’s original to deny Allende the presidency during the campaign period did 
not go according to plan, the administration did not relinquish their hold on the situation. In 
fact, the exact opposite occurred. In the face of defeat at Track I and II, Nixon and his 
administration decided that an economic blockade would influence society and express to the 
Chilean population that Allende could not deliver on his promises. Prior to Allende’s election in 
1970, International Development Bank loans totaling $46 million had been approved but only 
$2 million were approved during the entirety of his presidency. The World Bank had approved 
$31 million in loans during the Frei government between 1969 and 1970 but not a dime was 
lent between 1971 and 1973. Bilateral U.S. assistance from AID dropped from $110 million 
between 1968 and 1970 to $3 million between 1971 and 1973. The U.S. Export Import Bank 
went from lending almost $280 million between 1967 and 1970 to nothing in 197149 What this 
did, was strangle the Chilean economy, which still had over $1 billion in debts left from the Frei 
administration.  
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 While it appeared that the European countries were willing to help Chile with their 
massive debt, the US was not going to budge. While the outright foreign policy of the US 
towards Chile at this time was attempting to weaken the Chilean economy and limit the 
flexibility of the Allende regime, the CIA engaged in covert operations to try and weaken the 
support for Allende, while aiding the other political parties against Allende. Not only did the CIA 
provide financial support to the Christian Democrat Party, but it also provided support to the 
National Party and the Democratic Radical Party. In 1972 a total of $1,602,666 was 
appropriated to the CIA to covertly finance opposition campaigns. In August 1973 another 
$1,000,000 was provided to continue covert efforts to strengthen opposition political parties 
and private sector organizations opposed to Allende50. In addition to the strengthening of the 
opposition parties, the CIA undertook a massive propaganda campaign against the Allende 
administration. The campaign consisted of funding a very staunch right-wing newspaper named 
El Mercurio. The paper ran continuous articles to pressure and encourage the opposition 
against the Allende government, accusing his administration of attempting to nationalize banks, 
violating freedom of the press, and land seizures. 
 El Mercurio exposed every possible tension between the government and the 
democratic opposition and emphasized the problems and conflicts developing between the 
government and the armed forces. It was through this level of integration with the localities 
that CIA realized it would not be enough to just run newspaper ads smearing the Allende 
regime. The CIA was quick to realize that they would need the support of the military to actually 
enact the coup President Nixon so desperately wanted.  
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An article from the NY Times51 in 1974 reviews the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
and Kissinger’s testimony before its members. According to Kissinger, the CIA’s and State 
Departments involvement in Chile had solely been to keep certain political parties and media 
outlets alive that were threatened by Allende’s presidential victory. According to the Times, 
“Among those heavily subsidized, were the organizers of a nationwide truck strike that lasted 
26 days in the fall of 1972, seriously disrupting Chile's economy and provoking the first of a 
series of labor crises for President Allende” and that “at its peak, the 1973 strikes involved more 
than 250,000 truck drivers, shopkeepers and professionals who banded to gather in a middle‐
class movement that, many analysts have concluded, made a violent overthrow inevitable.”. So 
while we see even from this testimony of Kissinger, the US actively supported certain 
marginalized groups, which in a way supported the coup. While the US did not have a direct 
hand in the organization and carrying out of the military coup, by enabling the disenfranchised 
groups of Chilean society to rally behind General Pinochet. 
5.2 – WAS NIXON SUCCESSFUL? 
 Based on all the information available, we can now fully take account of what transpired 
in Chile during this time period, and the greater effects. It would be too polite to think of 
Nixon’s policy toward Chile as successful. Nixon tried from the very beginning to initiate a coup 
to overthrow Allende. As we know, all of those plans failed. The larger picture though, was 
actually painted quite masterfully. While the propaganda campaigns, the economic blockade, 
                                                 
51  Seymour Hersh, "C.I.A. Is Linked to Strikes in Chile That Beset Allende," New York Times (New York, 
NY), September 20, 1974,  
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and the coup-plotting did not rid Nixon of Allende, it certainly helped apply the right pressure 
on an already fractured Chilean society. The key moment in this entire era, can be seen in the 
economic blockade. Chile already had acquired massive debt under Frei, and the Chilean people 
were now feeling the full force of it when the US halted most aid. The money going into 
opposition parties and media also played a huge role in the setting of the stage for the eventual 
coup.  
I believe, here, it is not so much was Nixon successful, but rather in what was capacity 
were his policies successful if we keep the bigger picture in mind. While I do not in any way 
attempt to justify the atrocity that Nixon was setting the Chilean people up for, it needs to be 
said that the US’ actual hand in the armed revolt and the establishment of Pinochet’s bloody 
military regime is slim. The way to properly view US involvement in Chile is through the 
implementation of certain ideological reinforcements; whether they be purposeful or 
accidentally planted, in the Chilean mind. This point can especially be seen in the subsidized 
groups that are mentioned above.  
CHAPTER 6: WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM CHILE 
 
6.1 -- STRUCTURE OF US FOREIGN POLICY 
 
In the 1960’s when Eduardo Frei was running for the presidency, President Kennedy 
avidly supported him and his Christian Democrats. The Kennedy Administration supplied him 
with ample monetary support as well as planning support for how to obtain the presidency. The 
Kennedy Administration also dealt with this problem with plenty of time to spare, and with that 
knowledge the US  As is stated in the Helms Testimony: “In other words, just getting behind the 
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candidate, giving him money and support…and enough in advance so they actually did some 
good… I think this was going on a year or two before the election”52. So from this one account 
of Richard Helms we can understand that the previous decision to support the Frei campaign 
was handled promptly and efficiently by the administration at the time. But the same was not 
the case for the attempt to block Salvador Allende from office in the 1970’s. As Helms notes in 
the same testimony, “in ’70 there was a desire to suddenly, at a very late date, to do something 
because it suddenly dawned on the Administration that Allende might easily come to power.”. 
Helms states as well that it was just too little too late for the Administration to do anything 
effective about Allende. He refers to the case with Frei and reminds the Committee that when 
Kennedy planned to support Frei, there was plenty of time to come up with a route and a plan 
of action and then everything fell into place. The difference in methodology between the Frei 
and Allende election, is a result of poor timing and operational planning/awareness by part of 
the Nixon Administration. If Nixon had either intervened earlier than he did, or had not 
intervened at all like some officials from the State Department had wanted, Chile would have 
been in a very different boat. 
In May of 1968, William Broe, chief of the CIA’s Western Hemisphere Division suggested 
that the US should intervene in the 1969 Congressional elections, realizing their importance for 
the upcoming September 1970 election. Broe said “these elections [were] all-important since 
their outcome [would] determine the nature of the party alliances that [would] be formed in 
connection with the presidential election of September 1970.”53 Taking Broe’s advice into 
                                                 
52 Hearing Held before Senate Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to 
Intelligence Activities (1975) (statement of Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms). [pg. 15] 
53 William V. Broe, “Circumstances Leading Up to CIA Participation in Electoral Operations in Chile,” 
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consideration the US initiated a covert operation to affect the outcome of the 1969 
Congressional elections, and around the same time the second National Intelligence Estimate 
was released on Chile in January of 1969. What is shocking from the fact that Broe had to 
suggested this plan of action is that the US had lost touch on what was going on in Chile. 
Especially when you consider the amount of interest taken by the Kennedy administration to 
ensure Frei was elected in 1964. The level of commitment or lack thereof, by both State and CIA 
could be considered one of the fatal flaws of US intelligence during this time. The Kennedy 
administration did such a fantastic job of helping finance and support the Frei administration to 
ensure his victory over Allende, and it is not hard to imagine that with proper time and 
resources, the same result could have held in this election as well. 
The Chilean case is significant for many reasons. There is the first and maybe most 
important one, of whether Nixon made the right call or not. We know that the US did not have 
a hand in the coup per se, that it was done via General Pinochet and his military personnel, but 
the US did channel support to military officials prior to the coup itself. The next issue is that 
who was right; the CIA or State Department. We see that the State Department was adamant 
about not getting involved whatsoever, and that they were actively left out of the discussion of 
Track II. In September of 1970, the Chilean Congress rejected a parliamentary maneuver to 
block Allende's inauguration. CIA operatives in Santiago then began to canvass a move by the 
Chilean military. But the CIA quickly backed off. The military, which three years later had a 
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different view, refused in 1970 to intrude on the constitutional process. The CIA so reported to 
Kissinger, then National Security Adviser, and on October 15, 1970, he ended U.S. involvement 
in the anti-Allende plotting. Kissinger later told the president, "This thing looked hopeless. I 
turned it off. Nothing could be worse than an abortive coup”54 But, according to the Church 
Commission's report, when CIA operatives relayed the turn-off instruction to the Chilean army, 
the plotters responded that they were going ahead anyway. 
 Regardless of what Kissinger said, it is easy to understand that the US desired a military 
coup and saw it as the only way to remove Allende from office, so while it might have ended, in 
reality the US just left it to the Chilean military officials. As we saw from the evidence above, 
Tracks I and II, as well as all the pre-election propaganda that the US funded and supported, 
had a huge impact on the already polarized Chilean society. Mark Falcoff writes perfectly in his 
2003 article that “the thrust of U.S. policy shifted to sustaining a democratic opposition and an 
independent press”55.  So while the coup of 1973 was not directly done by US hands, it had a 
huge role in the climate that led the eventual coup. Nixon’s administration collapsed the 
Chilean economy as well as further deepening the divide of the political parties, and in the end 
Allende’s administration brought about their eventual overthrow by sitting in water tainted 
with US dirt.  
A TelCon dated September 16, 2973 between Kissinger and Nixon shows exactly what 
                                                 
54 TELCON: September 16, 1973, 11:50 A.M. Kissinger Talking to Nixon. 
55 Mark Falcoff, "Kissinger and Chile: The Myth That Will Not Die," Commentary Magazine, November 1, 
2003, accessed April 14, 2018, https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/kissinger-chile-the-
myth-that-will-not-die/. 
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they did. They admit it. It is not that long of a conversation, but it is so significant I need to put 
it in here. The conversation is as follows:  
 
- Nixon: Nothing new of any importance or is there? 
- Kissinger: The Chilean thing is getting consolidated and of course the newspapers and 
bleeding because a pro-Communist government has been overthrown. 
- Nixon: Isn’t that something. 
- Kissinger: In the Eisenhower period we would be hero’s. 
- Nixon: Well we didn’t – as you know – our hand doesn’t show on this one. 
- Kissinger: We didn’t do it. I mean we helped them. Created the conditions as great as 
possible. 
- Nixon: That is right. And that is the way it is going to be played. 
 
Not only is this such damning and incriminating proof, but everything I have said above, 
from the propaganda, to economic sanctions, to opposition party support, now all said in the 
words of the two puppet-masters themselves. 
 
 
6.2 – INTELLIGENCE VS DIPLOMACY  
 
Upon my review of the William Colby Testimony before the Church Committee in 1975, 
as well as the Richard Helms Testimony before a Senate Subcommittee in the same year the 
way in which foreign policy comes to fruition becomes more clear. Helms says that the officials 
in the Nixon Administration were not concerned with Chile, “They were preoccupied with 
Vietnam and things of that sort, openings to China and the Soviet Union.”. The case of Chile and 
the US foreign policy that shaped its route for years to follow is not a needle in a haystack by 
any means. The US has had its hand in multiple bags all over the world. The case of Chile, does 
however, illustrate the relationship between formal diplomacy and covert intelligence. Both act 
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as a means to the end, but in the case of Chile, the means do not necessarily justify the ends. As 
we see from the conversation between Kissinger and Nixon, that because the certain steps 
were not taken in the beginning, the coup was going to fail. But it is because of those hurried 
steps the administration took, that we see the climate that was cultivated by Nixon and 
Kissinger.   
 
One thing I really want to highlight here is the intelligence community and their role in 
all of this. It is apparent that the CIA had significant pull in the decision making process. Now 
this can fall upon a number of factors, such as personal agendas, of say The President, Richard 
Nixon. In the Helms Testimony, Helms puts it perfectly when talking on the way in which 
foreign policy is very much a top down kind of thing. Helms recalls that:  
 
“People at the top policy levels weren’t paying much attention to Chile… This is an aspect of 
government that we could spend two minutes on, and that is that government tends to run by 
the perceptions of a President and what his interests are, and its extraordinarily difficult to get 
things for other things.”56 
 
What we can learn from Chile and the way the US handled it, is actually rather simple 
when it all boils down. Officials in positions of power, meaning real power to initiate policy, 
need to be really listening to the advice of their intelligence apparatus. We clearly see a lack of 
concern over Chile until it is far too late. When viewing the abortive coup in 1970, and all the 
ramped up work the US did trying to push on its behalf, the 1973 junta leaders probably felt 
validated that Nixon had essentially left them in charge. Now only years in the future can we 
                                                 
56 Hearing Held before Senate Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to 
Intelligence Activities (1975) [pg. 16] 
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fully understand the essence and blunders of these events, but the lessons still hold true. Heed 
the warning of your intelligence, and enable those around you to be a part of how you digest 
said intelligence. The substantive take-away from this relates back to the proper relationship 
between intelligence agencies and diplomatic agencies, the way in which they should feed off 
one another and unite to properly handle world events. The disagreement between State 
Department and CIA demonstrates that when at wits-end, very fine aspects of policy come 
under fire and are even lost. Ultimately, the 1973 coup in Chile should make policy-makers and 
intelligence officials more wary of the effect rushed work has on world events.  
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